Does media attention drive corporate social responsibility? by Georgiadis, A et al.











Does Media Attention Drive Corporate Social Responsibility?


As many authors have argued, the mass media can exert a great deal of influence on corporate behaviour in general, and CSR in particular (Baron, 2005; Berman, Wicks, Kotha, and Jones, 1999; Chen and Meindl, 1991; Fombrun and Shanley, 1990; Siegel and Vitaliano, 2007; Henriques and Sadorsky, 1999). Corporations depend on what the media report about them because the media are the main legitimate source of information asymmetry reduction for many stakeholders (McWilliams and Siegel, 2001; Siegel and Vitaliano, 2007), who might not have any direct interaction with the corporation (Deephouse, 2000: 1098). Moreover, the media are not only “vehicles for advertising and mirrors of reality reflecting firms’ actions,” they also are “active agents shaping information through editorials and feature articles” (Fombrun and Shanley, 1990: 240), thus having the power to influence the opinions of many stakeholders, as a long series of research in mass communication studies indicates (Ader, 1995; Behr and Iyengar, 1985; Benton and Frazier, 1976; Dalton, Beck, Huckfeldt, and Koetzle, 1998; McCombs and Shaw, 1972). Freeman captured this important influence that the mass media can have on corporate behaviour, when he said that “little stirs the anger in an executive more than an unfair story in the press” (1984: 22).
In this paper, we investigate the impact that media attention plays on the CSR behaviour of firms. Drawing on stakeholder theory (Freeman, 1984, 1994; Mitchell, Agle and Wood, 1997; Cummings and Doh, 2000; Fiss and Zajac, 2006), we argue that an increase in media attention will be positively associated with increased CSR by firms. However, drawing on our understanding of CSR as corporate “actions that appear to further some social good, beyond the interests of the firm and that which is required by law” (McWilliams and Siegel, 2001: 117), we identify two ways in which firms can engage in CSR. We argue that firms can go beyond what is required by law by increasing their CSR-strengths or by decreasing their CSR-weaknesses. We expect that media attention should have more of a positive impact on a firm’s CSR-strengths than its weaknesses and test our hypotheses using KLD data to measure the two aspects of CSR. Finally, we conclude by discussing our findings and their implications for further research. 
	
THEORETICAL DEVELOPMENT
CSR Strengths and Weaknesses
As mentioned earlier, drawing on the McWilliams and Siegel (2001) definition of CSR as corporate “actions that appear to further some social good, beyond the interests of the firm and that which is required by law” (2001: 117), we identify two ways in which a firm can engage in CSR. According to this definition, a firm operating within the law and focusing only on its short term economic profit does not engage in CSR, but this does not mean that through its operations its does not have both positive and negative effects on its various stakeholders. For example a manufacturing firm operating, but not engaging in any kind of CSR, might have both positive and negative effects on its nearby communities by providing employment opportunities while at the same time polluting within its legally allowed limits (externalities). Now, if such a firm wants to engage in CSR, it can increase its positive effects on the surrounding communities or decrease its negative ones. The firm could make donations to schools and hospitals in the area, or it could invest in facilities that reduce its emissions beyond what is required by law. In both cases, according to the McWilliams and Siegel (2001) definition, the firm would be engaging in CSR because in both cases it will be furthering some social good, beyond its immediate economic interest and what is legally expected of it, in the first case by adding to the positive, and in the second case by reducing the negative.
Based now on these two ways in which firms can engage in CSR, we can identify a firm’s CSR strengths and weaknesses at a particular point in time as follows. CSR strengths refer to the additional benefits beyond those required by law and narrow economic interest that a firm provides to its stakeholders. CSR weaknesses refer to the negative effects that the firm’s operations have on its stakeholders that are left over after the firm’s CSR activities. For example, in the case of the above mentioned hypothetical manufacturing firm, its CSR strengths would refer to the various donations it has given to the local schools and hospitals, whereas its CSR weaknesses would refer to the remaining legally allowed pollution that its CSR activities (pollution reduction investments) have not yet neutralized. In other words, while CSR strengths refer to the additional good that a firm provides to its stakeholders, CSR weaknesses refer to the leftover bad from which it does not protect its stakeholders. A depiction of this model of CSR can be seen in figure 1, following.
-------------------------------------
Insert Figure 1 about here
--------------------------------------
These two aspects of CSR have one important difference. It would seem that the degrees of freedom a firm has in improving its strengths are greater than the degrees of freedom it has in reducing its weaknesses. In improving its CSR strengths, a firm can choose to donate to any one of a long list of charities, increase any aspect from the benefits it provides its employees, or engage in various other activities that benefit various stakeholders beyond the firm’s basic economic-legal mandate. On the other hand, in reducing its CSR weaknesses, it has no alternative but to focus on the particular aspect of its operations that have negative side-effects on society. For example, a firm polluting its environment with a specific toxic waste can increase its CSR strengths in multiple ways, whereas it can only reduce its CSR weaknesses by reducing its emission of that particular toxic substance.

Media Attention as a Driver of CSR
 	Media attention refers to the awareness of a particular object, in this case a corporation, by the media (Kiousis, 2004; Manheim, 1986), “usually gauged by the sheer volume of stories or space dedicated to topics in newspapers, television news and so on” (Kiousis, 2004: 74). Media attention has been studied both within the field of communications (Chyi and McCombs, 2004; Wanta and Ghanem, 2000) and the management literature (Fiss and Zajac, 2006; Meznar & Nigh, 1995)​[1]​. Within the communications field, the emphasis has been mostly on the impact of media attention on public opinion, while within the management field, the role of media attention has been investigated in various ways. For example, Winter and Eyal (1981), within the communications field, found that the public’s concerns about civil rights were significantly correlated to the volume of news coverage of civil rights in the weeks prior to the Gallup Poll that measured public opinion; whereas, within the management literature, Fiss and Zajac (2006) found that media attention influences firm behaviour because firms receiving greater levels of media attention tended to use a balancing framing approach. In this paper, we argue that highly visible firms will tend to invest more in their CSR activities than less visible firms, and drawing on stakeholder theory we identify two reasons. First, we argue that because more visible firms tend to receive more diverse stakeholder demands (Fiss and Zajac, 2006) they will tend to engage more in CSR activities, as a way of meeting these demands. Second, we argue that because more visible firms are more vulnerable to crises they would engage in CSR activities as a way of building a positive reputation capital for when a crisis arises (Godfrey, 2005).   
	Argument from Stakeholder Demand Diversity: According to Stakeholder Theory, business firms, in order to succeed over the long term, must satisfy the often conflicting demands of diverse stakeholders (Freeman, 1984, 1994). And as some stakeholders are more important than others for the survival and success of the firm (Mitchell, Agle and Wood, 1997; Cummings and Doh, 2000), some firms are more vulnerable than others to stakeholder pressures (Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978; Oliver, 1991; Fiss and Zajac, 2006). Furthermore, Fiss and Zajac (2006) found that business firms that are more visible and receive more media attention are also more vulnerable to stakeholder pressures “because of the resulting exposure to multiple stakeholder groups” and also “face greater pressures to adapt the framing of their actions to pressure from multiple sources” (2006: 1177). Indeed, Fiss and Zajac (2006) found that more visible firms tended to follow a balancing framework approach, which seeks “to accommodate the diverging interests of different constituents” (2006: 1176). Complementing these findings, Baker, Powell, and Weaver (1999) argue that firms receiving low levels of media attention are ‘neglected’ and “define a neglected firm as one that is under less scrutiny by news agencies, financial analysts, and institutional investors than other firms” (1999: 47). 
	Firms receiving higher levels of media attention therefore find themselves under greater levels of scrutiny from many stakeholder groups, which most likely would make their demands known to them. For example, more visible firms are more likely to become campaign targets by social movement organizations and other NGOs whose consumer influence has increased significantly in the last decades (Ettenson, and Klein, 2005; Friedman, 1991, 1999), as these groups through their actions not only aim to protect their interests but are also expressing/building their identity (Rowley and Moldoveanu, 2003). Positioning oneself vis-à-vis a highly visible company is one of the easiest ways for a stakeholder group to establish and signal its identity. Accordingly, Rehbein, Waddock, and Graves (2004) found that shareholders activists tend to choose larger, more visible corporations as their campaign targets. In other words, while most firms face the risk of a consumer boycott, a risk that has been increasing constantly in the last decades (Friedman, 1991; Gelb, 1995; John and Klein, 2003; Sen, Gurham-Canli, and Morwitz, 2001), more visible companies face the additional risk of becoming targets of politically motivated consumer boycotts aimed at the country with which they are identified (Ettenson and Klein, 2005; Ettenson, Smith, Klein, and John, 2006). For example, Coca-Cola is being boycotted in some Arab countries, including Iran, because it is seen as representing the United States of America, with an Iranian company taking advantage of the opportunity to promote its own ZamZamCola as an alternative in the region (Ettenson, Smith, Klein, and John, 2006). In short, we may say that more visible firms not only face more diverse stakeholder pressures but also more intense scrutiny from various stakeholders. 
	More visible firms then faced with increased and diverse demands from various stakeholders would probably respond to these demands through their CSR activities. This is likely because it is through CSR that firms can most easily address the demands from various stakeholders, demands which often cannot be addressed through their main business mission and requires them to go “beyond the interests of the firm and that which is required by law” (McWilliams and Siegel, 2001: 117). Gunningham, Kagan, and Thornton (2004) argued that often business firms have to demonstrate mere legal compliance so that they can attain from society their ‘social licence’ to operate. A ‘social licence’ means that corporations might have to meet the social expectations of the various stakeholder groups their operations impact, irrespective of whether these expectations have been codified in existing legal requirements not included in their main mission. Given the diverse and increased demands that visible firms often face, these firms are more likely to have to acquire a social licence to operate, something which would mean that they would most likely engage in higher levels of CSR activities if they are to attain their social licence.
Argument from Vulnerability to Crises: Firms receiving more visibility could also face greater risks of running into trouble with their various stakeholders, as even minor mishaps could be picked up by the media and reported, whereas similar mishaps of lower attention firms might escape detection. Thus, more visible firms might have greater incentives to invest in ways to protect themselves, and CSR has been identified by a number of researchers as a kind of moral capital, which can serve such a protective function in case of crisis. Godfrey (2005) argued that when stakeholders perceive a firm to have performed a ‘bad act,’ they invoke a ‘cognitive template suggested by the mens rea doctrine to help determine appropriate sanctions’ (2005: 788). The notion of ‘mens rea’ comes from the common law tradition under which ‘two elements must be present for an offence to occur: a bad act and a bad mind (LaFave, 2000)’ (Godfrey, 2005: 787), which explains the rationale of character witnesses in trials. Using this rationale, Godfrey (2005) argues that corporate philanthropy – a particular aspect of CSR – is a ‘positive moral capital that acts as character evidence on behalf of the firm’ (2005:788), when it is caught performing a ‘bad act’. Of course, one could expect the same rationale to apply as well to most other aspects of CSR, as most of them can also act as ‘character evidence’. In a similar manner Peloza (2006) argued that CSR “can offer a crucial advantage to managers by providing a means of insuring financial performance against negative events” (2006: 52), and Schnietz and Epstein (2005) found evidence that CSR contributes to the firm’s reputation for social responsibility, which protects firms from stock declines associated with crises. Sen, Bhattacharya, and Korchun (2006) capture this protective aspect of CSR when they refer to it as a ‘reputational shield,’ which can help protect a firm in the case of negative events. Of course, not all firms should be expected to see CSR as a ‘reputational shield,’ but on average we would expect that such a view of CSR would add to the reasons why we expect more visible firms to improve their CSR behaviour. 

Hypothesis 1: Firms will respond to increased media attention by improving their CSR performance, in other words, either by increasing their strengths and/or by reducing their CSR weaknesses.

However, given the two aspects of CSR we identified in the previous section, does media attention influence the evolution of CSR-strengths and CSR-weaknesses to the same degree?
We expect that highly visible firms will find it easier to respond to diverse stakeholder pressures by increasing their CSR-strengths rather than by decreasing their CSR-weaknesses. This expectation follows from our understanding of CSR-strengths as having greater degrees of freedom (being more diverse in nature) and our expectation that higher visibility firms will attract demands from more diverse stakeholders. Therefore, more visible firms, in having to deal with more diverse demands from their stakeholders, would need to rely more on their CSR-strengths than their CSR-weaknesses, which are more limited to that particular aspect of the firm’s operations that has negative side effects on society.

Hypothesis 2: Firms will be more likely to respond to increased media attention by increasing their CSR strengths than by reducing their CSR weaknesses.

METHODS
Sample and Data Collection
	We determined the sample for this study by identifying from the S&P 500 US firms those for which the Kinder Lydenburg Domini Analytics Social Ratings Data (KLD) reported scores continuously for all five years 2000-2004. Moreover, we drew on the KLD database to measure CSR-strengths and weaknesses, on Mergent for most of the financial data and on Lexis-Nexis and ABI-inform for data on media attention. We started with the total of 367 companies, which appeared continuously on the S&P 500 list for all years 2000-2004, a total of 1835 data-points, but often ended up with smaller numbers in our various regression models given lagged variables and missing values due to the integration of various databases.

Measures
Dependent Variables: We measure CSR-strengths and CSR-weaknesses drawing on the Kinder Lydenburg Domini Analytics Social Ratings Data (KLD), which has been used repeatedly in the literature to operationalize CSR (Bansal and Clelland, 2004; Hillman and Keim, 2001; Johnson and Greening, 1999; Mattingly and Berman, 2006; Turban and Greening, 1997; Waddock and Graves, 1997), and is considered by some to be “the de facto research standard at the moment” for measuring CSR (Waddock, 2003: 369). The KLD database measures firm CSR strengths and weaknesses of the S&P 500 firms yearly (at least for the years under consideration here, 2000-2004) along thirteen dimensions. From these dimensions, we chose five (community, diversity, employees, environment, product), which have been repeatedly used in the literature to measure CSR.  KLD ratings have a number of advantages, such as rating firms with an objective set of screening criteria, applying the ratings consistently across companies, and using a staff of independent (from the companies), knowledgeable individuals (Johnson and Greening, 1999; Graves and Waddock, 1994; Turban and Greening, 1997). To measure CSR-strengths, we added the number of strengths that KLD gave to the companies in our sample each year for all the five years between 2000 and 2004, whereas to measure CSR-weaknesses, we added the concerns that KLD attributed to our sample.
Independent Variable: Following Meznar and Nigh (1995) and Fiss and Zajac (2006), we measured media attention by using the yearly number of articles mentioning the firm’s name in four major US newspapers, the New York Times, the Wall Street Journal, the Washington Post, and the Los Angeles Times. The New York Times is considered within the communication field as “the elite U.S. newspaper” (Winter and Eyal, 1981: 379), which other media consider as a benchmark (Carroll, 2004). The Washington Post is the second leading US daily, next to the New York Times, the Wall Street Journal is the major US daily focusing on financial reporting, and the Los Angeles Times is the fourth largest newspaper by distribution in the US. We used the average of these article counts as an indicator of media attention because the four items had an acceptable reliability with a Cronbach alpha of 0.72. Moreover, a principal component factor analysis found that all four loaded on one factor, with factor loadings ranging from 0.74 to 0.86. Data for the New York Times, the Washington Post, and Los Angeles Times were collected through Lexis-Nexis, while data for the Wall Street Journal through ABI Inform.
Control variables: We controlled for a number of variables that prior research has indicated might be relevant for our models. First, we controlled for the level of CSR-strengths and CSR-weaknesses of a given firm during the previous year. This led to the loss of some data points in all models, but was considered necessary because we are investigating the impact that the media attention a firm receives at a point in time has for the change in its CSR. Second, following prior practice in the field, we controlled for firm size using the logarithm of the firm’s revenues, and third we controlled for financial performance by including the firm’s Return on Equity (ROE) (Berrone and Gomez-Mejia, 2009; Finkelstein and Boyd, 1998). Fourth as an alternative to ROE we also (in different models) controlled for market-based performance by using Tobin’s Q, which, following Berrone and Gomez-Mejia (2009), Chung and Pruitt (1994) and Makri, Lane and Gomez-Mejia (2006), we calculated by dividing the sum of firm equity value plus the book value of its total debt by total assets. We felt it was necessary to control for market performance through Tobin’s Q as well because as Montgomery and Wernerfelt (1988) noticed, Tobin’s Q is “less susceptible to accounting based distortions because it relies on stock market values” (David at al., 2010: 643) and “it is forward looking in incorporating not just current profitability, but also future profitability” (David at al., 2010: 643). Finally, in all models we controlled for industry effects by using 2-digit SIC codes.

Estimation Methods
Given the nature of our data, which consist of multiple (367) firms over five years, we estimate different statistical models of the determination of CSR strengths and weaknesses using panel data estimation methods. In particular we estimate each model using fixed effects estimation. Fixed effects is equivalent to OLS estimation of the model including dummies for each observation (firm) and in this way this method controls for relevant unobserved and observed time invariant firm specific factors (e.g. industry, region, managerial ability, etc.) which if omitted from the model often lead to a considerable bias of the estimated results (omitted variable bias). The main disadvantage of fixed effects is that it is usually less efficient than alternative methods in the sense that produces larger standard errors of estimated coefficients. An alternative method which is more efficient than fixed effects is the random effects method but it hinges on strong assumptions about the distribution of the error term of the model. For our particular application we use the Hausman test that enables one to choose the most appropriate method of the two (Wooldridge, 2002). The results of the Hausman test suggested that fixed effects is to be preferred. 
An alternative statistical method that we could have used, often employed in longitudinal data analysis by several disciplines, is hierarchical or multilevel linear modelling (HLM). HLM accounts for the fact that observations may be nested i.e. firms are nested within industries and industries are nested within regions and this nesting leads to dependency and heterogeneity in residuals which if not taken into account leads to incorrect standard errors of estimates and invalid statistical inferences (Bickel, 2007). However, HLM is preferred when one is interested in estimating contextual effects as for example industry factors such as industry size composition and other characteristics and/or interactions of contextual effects with firm effects separately from firm effects (Bickel, 2007). 
Overall, using the above method, we run two sets of regression models, one set with CSR-strengths (models A) and one with CSR–weaknesses (models B) as the dependent variables, respectively. 

FINDINGS
	Table 1 reports the descriptive statistics and bi-variate correlations of the variables we used in this study. Given that often our variables are highly correlated, we tested for multicolinearity but found that the Variance Inflation Factors (VIFs) were always within an acceptable range, max VIF was bellow 2.
-------------------------------
Insert Table 1 about here
-------------------------------
	Hypothesis 1 predicts that firms will tend to respond to increased media attention by either adding to their CSR strengths and/or by reducing their CSR weaknesses. As can be seen in models A and B in tables 2 and 3, partial support for this hypothesis was found because while media attention (t-1) and (t-2) always reached a certain level of significance for the models with CSR-strengths (A models) as the dependent variable, media attention never reached any levels of significance for the models with CSR-weaknesses as the dependent variable (B models). More specifically, in models A2 to A4, the coefficient for media attention for both t-1 and t-2 reached levels of significance p < 0.001. 
	Hypothesis 2 predicts that firms will be more likely to respond to increased media attention by increasing their CSR strengths than by reducing their CSR weaknesses, and clear support for this hypothesis was found. As can be seen in table 2, in both models examining the impact of media attention on CSR-strengths, we found the media attention coefficient to be significant, whereas in no model from the ones examining the impact of media attention of CSR-weaknesses did the coefficient of media attention come even close to being significant and negative.
  ----------------------------------------------
Insert Tables 2 and 3 about here
-----------------------------------------------

DISCUSSION, IMPLICATIONS AND CONCLUSION
Within the Business and Society literature, our investigation of media attention as a CSR driver can be seen as a partial response to the comment of Aguilera, Rupp, Williams, and Ganapathi (2007) that “an important new line of inquiry within [the B&S] field is no longer whether CSR works but, rather, what catalyzes organizations to engage in increasingly robust CSR initiatives and impart social change” (2007:837). In a sense our findings here can be seen as adding to the many lines of research within the B&S field investigating the drivers of CSR, or as McWilliams, Siegel and Wright (2006:2) refer to them, the antecedents of CSR. For example, our findings can be seen as complementing “slack resources theory” (McGuire, Sundgren, and Schneeweiss, 1988; Orlitzky, Schmidt, and Rynes, 2003; Waddock and Graves, 1997), which argues that an important driver of CSR is financial performance. Or, our findings can be seen as identifying the impact that the media, a particularly powerful stakeholder, can have as a CSR driver within a stakeholder line of research, which would argue that it is stakeholder pressures that drive CSR (Brammer and Millington, 2004; Freeman, 1984; Henriques and Sadorsky, 1999; Kassinis and Vafeas, 2006; Shrivastava, 1995).
But in spite of its contributions, our work has at least two major limitations, both related to the fact that our investigation of the media’s influence and our CSR constructs is not fine-grained enough. In other words, there are other aspects of media coverage the influence of which on CSR should be investigated in the future. For example, one could reasonably argue that media prominence, “the positioning of a story [about a firm] within a media text” (Kiousis, 2004: 74), could have a significant impact on CSR. Even the New York Times ethics test​[2]​ refers to front page coverage. Or one could investigate the role of media valence, the affective (positive or negative) and cognitive aspects of the news (Kiousis, 2004: 75) stories about particular firms on their CSR. Moreover, different CSR activities relating to particular social issues​[3]​ are not identified. It is quite likely, for example, that firms will be more sensitive to media coverage relating to some social issues versus others, like social issues advanced in their life cycle trajectory (Ackerman, 1975; Bigelow and Fahey, 1993; Mahon and Waddock, 1992)​[4]​. And in such cases, firms might engage in particular CSR activities related to the issue receiving media attention in relation to them.
In conclusion, this study found that media attention does influence CSR-strengths but not CSR-weaknesses. These findings are in line with our expectations that firms will find it easier to engage in CSR – because of the many alternatives available to them – by increasing their CSR-strengths rather than by reducing their CSR-weaknesses. Therefore, media attention could be considered as an important driver of CSR, even though it seems to be driving one of its two aspects more than the other.
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^1	  Within the management field, what we refer to as ‘media attention’ is usually referred to as ‘media visibility’ (Fiss and Zajac, 2006). However, within the field of communication studies, the term ‘media visibility’ refers not only to amount of attention the media pay to a particular object but also the prominence of the coverage that the object receives (Kiousis, 2004; Manheim, 1986). In other words, within the field of communication ‘media visibility’ refers both to media attention, “[the] media awareness of an object, usually gauged by the sheer volume of stories or space dedicated to topics in newspapers, television news and so on” (Kiousis, 2004: 74); and prominence, “the positioning of a story within a media text to communicate its importance” (Kiousis, 2004: 74), the placement of the story, its size, the pictures or other visual devices used and so on (Williams, 1985). Here, we follow the communication studies terminology. Therefore one should note that what we refer to as ‘media attention,’ other studies within management might refer to as ‘media visibility.’
^2	  Do not do something unless you do not mind seeing what you did in the front page of the New York Times.
^3	 According to Mahon and Waddock (1992), social issues are “social problems that may exist objectively but become issues requiring managerial attention when they are defined as being problematic to society or an institution within society by a group of actors or stakeholders capable of influencing either governmental action or company policies” (1992: 20).
^4	 According to social issue life cycle theory, the importance of a particular social issue changes with time, with most issues evolving from a period of relative insignificance, through a period of increased societal attention and potential conflict, to a period where new solutions and routines regarding the issue are institutionalized within society. Therefore, the importance of media coverage could differ quite a lot depending on the stage of the issue. 
